Resolving the Identification Problem in Linear Social Interactions Models: Modeling with Between-Group Spillovers by Ethan Cohen-Cole
Resolving the Identiﬁcation Problem in Linear
Social Interactions Models: Modeling with
Between-Group Spillovers
Ethan Cohen-Cole∗





First Version July, 2004
This Version December, 2004
Abstract
The linear-in-means model has been a theoretical and empirical
workhorse of the social interactions ﬁeld. As was noted by Manski (1993),
the collinearity between group-level "contextual" and "endogenous" ef-
fects leads to an inability to identify the structural parameters of this
model. Manski called this the "reﬂection" problem. This paper suggests
that Manksi’s reﬂection problem is unique to a special case of a more gen-
eral context in which agents care about multiple reference groups. Speciﬁ-
cally, the identiﬁcation problem is resolved through a model generalization
to include between-group and within-group eﬀects.
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1“Functional relations between groups which are of consequence to the groups
in question will tend to bring about changes in the pattern of relations within
the in-groups involved”
“The course of relations between two groups ... in a state of competition and
frustration will tend to produce an increase in in-group solidarity."
"From a theoretical point of view... events occurring between groups have
consequences at both a group level (norms relating to the out-group) and at a
psychological level (formation of negative attitudes toward the out-group)"
M Sherif, et al. (1961) Robbers Cave Experiment
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a method for identifying endogenous
social eﬀects. These eﬀects, where an individual is presumed to respond to the
norms or expectations of behavior of his or her reference groups, are increasingly
used by economists to explain phenomena not readily explained through pure
individual eﬀects. As in economic studies that focus on purely individual eﬀects,
many economists rely on the use of linear regression models to explain social
eﬀects. The most common formulation of such a model is the "linear-in-means"
model, so dubbed because agents are assumed to include the mean behavior of
their reference group in their utility function. Both the linear structure and
the simple interpretation of the coeﬃcient of this mean-behavior term (as the
degree to which agents respond to social norms) lead to frequent use of this
model.
An additional advantage of the model is that the three types of social in-
teractions outlined by Manski (1993) can be simply encompassed. The ﬁrst of
these three types are endogenous eﬀects, where an individual’s actions vary with
the expectation of those of his/her reference group. The second are contextual
(exogenous) eﬀects, where individual behavior varies with (exogenous) observed
mean characteristics of a group. The ﬁnal eﬀects are correlated eﬀects, where
individuals act similarly due to shared institutional or individual characteristics.
2In a linear model, any or all of these eﬀects can be represented as additively
separable components of an agents’ utility function. Endogenous eﬀects are of
particular interest to researchers since they are a potential explanation of social
multipliers (c.f. Durlauf 2004).
The diﬃculty that presents itself was noted in Manski’s seminal 1993 paper:
group-level “contextual” and “endogenous” eﬀects are empirically indistinguish-
able — leading to an inability to identify the structural parameters of this model.
Manski called this the "reﬂection" problem. As many researchers have discov-
ered, the reﬂection problem makes many problems diﬃcult or impossible to
solve. A classic question in this literature addresses how students are aﬀected
by the actions of their peers. The reﬂection problem presents itself in that
a researcher will not be able to distinguish between the inﬂuence of the mean
behavior of other students in the class and the inﬂuence of a shared environment
(such as the quality of classroom materials or teacher). As will be illustrated
below, in a linear model, these eﬀects are econometrically indistinguishable. To
date, the two principle methods for answering this type of problem to assume
either the ability to distinguish between endogenous and contextual eﬀects due
to some characteristic feature of the problem, or to introduce some type of
non-linearity into the model. Doing so runs the obvious risk that inference
is inaccurate both from the assumption itself and from ignoring the eﬀect of
students’ reactions to other groups.
However, it is found that this "reﬂection" problem is unique to a limited
special case of a more general context. That is, the inability to identify endoge-
nous social interactions only exists when agents care exclusively about their own
reference group. As the problem is generalized to allow agents to consider the
behavior of other groups, it is found that inference is possible with only minor
conditions. That is, once we consider how students react to the actions and con-
text of students in the next classroom, we can isolate the two previously collinear
eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, the identiﬁcation problem is resolved through a model gen-
eralization to include between-group eﬀects (agents’ concern for the behavior
in other groups) in addition to within-group eﬀects. Agents respond distinctly
3to others’ actions within their own reference group as well as to those within
other groups. The reﬂection problem manifests when agents are restricted to
consider only the actions of a single group.
The work of justifying the inclusion of social eﬀects into utility functions
has been done thoroughly; however, a brief comment is due. The precedent
for including social eﬀects is long-standing, particularly in the sociology litera-
ture. This study incorporates mechanisms by which people respond to reference
groups outside of their own. A famous example is Sherif’s 1954 Robbers Cave
experiment (c.f. Sherif, et al. (1961)). Sherif and his colleagues illustrated that
groups of teenage boys with no prior connection could form both in and out-
group stereotypes based solely on the researchers’ experimental set-up. One of
the implications is that people behave in part based on their beliefs about their
own group and about other groups.
Similar research has increasingly been accepted in the economics ﬁeld. Though
long a subject of debate, a rising number of economics studies have now found
evidence that social interactions exist within a person’s reference group. A few
well-known examples are Case & Katz (1991), Ioannides (2002), and Ioannides
& Zabel (2002,2003). Note that, of these, only Ioannides & Zabel (2003) seek to
distinguish endogenous eﬀects from contextual ones (see Durlauf (2004) for a full
review). And though the existence of multiple reference groups and between-
group eﬀects has been acknowledged, it is not been explored much empirically
or theoretically. A partial exception to this is a recent paper (Iyer & Weeks
2004) that evaluates two dimensions of endogenous interactions in the fertility
decisions of a group of women in Kenya. This ﬁrst eﬀort to expand the domain
of interactions analyzes Kenyan women’s reactions to their local village cluster
as well as their ethnic group as a whole. Iyer and Weeks, however, do not pro-
vide additional insight into the resolution of the reﬂection problem. They use
the reasonable assumption of Poisson non-linearity to describe fertility — thus
allowing identiﬁcation. Their paper is useful both in its thoughtful use of data
and in that it discusses some additional rationale for the use of multiple social
interactions. The study of these eﬀects is important not simply for their ability
4to resolve the identiﬁcation problem, but because they could provide further
insight into the existence of social motivations for agent behavior that are not
revealed in the context of single-eﬀect models.
As a further example, a multiple-interactions models suggests that a teenager
might care diﬀerently about what other young women do than about what young
men do — the assumption is that the boys and girls are distinct reference groups.
For example, a girl might be more prone to smoke if girls in her school do, but
less likely to if the boys do so. Or she might care being more inclined to smoke
based on the girls actions in her school, but less likely to based on those in other
schools. The vast majority of existing models impose a simpler framework of
decision making in which the girl’s decision must be based on a single group
(girls, school) or on a single metric of distance (distance from own school).
A third example of the relevance of multiple interactions is the case of ethnic
conﬂict. Evaluating agents’ behavior in the context of complex multi-ethnic
environments requires an understanding of between-group perceptions. That
is, one would have trouble evaluating Hutu-Tutsi conﬂict with endogenous ef-
fects constrained to respond only to the actions of an individual’s own group.1
Consider a single-group model to predict the occurrence of religious violence. A
single-group model would suggest increases in violence by Hutus are a function
of expectations of similar behavior or perceptions amongst this same group. It
would, however, ignore the role that expectations of Tutsi behavior play in in-
citing this violence since the models by deﬁnition are focused on a single group.
A san o t e ,as i n g l e - e ﬀect model would allow agents to consider actions by
both groups if they were to be placed along some measure of distance. However,
it nonetheless requires that this distance metric be deﬁned and, that it constrains
the responsiveness to be constant along this metric.
This paper’s method of resolving the identiﬁcation problem is to expand the
rank of the regressors used by including beliefs about out-group eﬀects. By
including an agent’s belief about other group’s actions as well as observables
1The Hutus and Tutsi are the predomint ethnic groups in Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern
C o n g o . A l lt h r e ea r e a sh a v eb e e nr i v e nw i t he t h n i c - b a s e dc o n ﬂict for many years.
5for each group, the model can be fully identiﬁed under the condition that the
matrix of observable parameters is of suﬃciently high rank. This increase in
dimensionality allows one to distinguish between contextual and endogenous ef-
fects by utilizing variation in between-group contextual eﬀects. For example, by
incorporating a Hindu agent’s reaction to both Hindu and Muslim contexts and
behavior, one gains increasing degrees of freedom. With suﬃcient information
on these contextual eﬀects, one can disentangle the desired endogenous eﬀects.
When the model is collapsed into a single group, the between-group variation
collapses to a single factor and can no longer be distinguished. Speciﬁcally,
identiﬁcation requires that the dimension of observable linearly-independent
contextual eﬀects be greater than or equal to the number of distinct groups
being evaluated.
2 Background
Linear models have a long tradition in economics due to their simplicity of
use and interpretation; these features are true for the linear-in-means model of
social interactions as well. They have been used by a wide range of researchers
in the search for evidence of social drivers of individual action. Some recent
papers have explicitly distinguished between endogenous and contextual eﬀects
within a linear model. Ioannides (2002) uses an example in which contextual
eﬀects can reasonably be considered to be non-present, and Ioannides & Zabel
(2003) use a case where they consider actual, rather than expected, behavior to
be a measure of endogenous actions. Both of these side-step the identiﬁcation
problem and allow interpretation of results.
Recent work by Brock & Durlauf (2001a,b) and Glaeser, Sacerdone, &
Scheinkman (1996) has introduced statistical mechanics models from physics
to explain discrete choice models of social interactions. Discrete choice models
are one of many possible non-linear models of interactions, and are intuitively
appealing since many of the agent choices studied to date are binary ones (e.g.
attend college, take drugs, join a neighborhood). Similar to Iyer and Weeks’ use
6of a Poisson model, these models, though analytically more complex, beneﬁt
from non-linearity in that they avoid problems of multi-collinearity central to
the identiﬁcation failure of linear models.
These strands of research model reference groups within a single neighbor-
hood. That is, once a particular driver of social action has been posited, its
eﬀect is a single function of social space between the agent and other agents in
the designated space. Models diﬀer in their deﬁnition of the function and in the
relevant space, but all of them assume a single dimension. To make this more
concrete, a model might assume that teenagers base their decision to smoke on
whether other teenagers do likewise. A “local” model (c.f. Glaeser, Sacerdone,
& Scheinkman (1996)) would specify that the agent cares only about the action
of the individual “closest” to her in some notion of space. A “global” model
would assume that the agent cares about all agents in her reference group. The
degree to which she cares might be a function of the “distance” within this
group, and the reference group might vary in size.
The goal of this paper is to allow general usage of the linear-in-means model
without the need to resort to the creative solutions used to date. In the past,
one needed to ﬁt agents into a single metric of distance, ﬁnd a appropriate non-
linearity, or ﬁnd solutions that allow exclusion restrictions on the basic linear
model.
3 The Expanded Linear-in-Means Model
We assume in this paper that agents care about their own reference groups in
the "global" sense deﬁned above. In addition, they care about the actions
taken in other reference groups - perhaps many of them. We further assume
that contextual eﬀects are measured on a relative basis. That is, when consid-
ering how to react to exogenous mean characteristics of a group, agents react to
their groups’ diﬀerence from a global mean. Referring to the smoking example,
it would be assumed that the girls care about the diﬀerence in anti-smoking
campaigns. That is, since there might be a social status-quo anti-smoking mes-
7sage, the ability of teachers to inﬂuence behavior is measured by their ability to
diﬀerentiate their message from the status-quo. As well, it would be assumed
that the girls care about the diﬀerence in action from the average behavior of
girls in society. If the average behavior is to smoke, then the peer eﬀect of all
girls smoking in her own reference group is considered to be irrelevant.
3.1 Theoretical Basis
Beginning with a simple outline of the foundations of the model: Consider Φ
individuals divided into J groups of various sizes. Each group has Ij individ-
uals, such that Φ =
X
j∈J Ij. Every individual i in each j makes a choice ω
j
i
(taken from the set of possible behaviors Ω
j
i). It is assumed here that all agents
choose from the same set of actions. This set of individual-level choices can be
aggregated across groups to produce probabilistic descriptions of social behav-
ior. Since agents are inﬂuenced by others within their group and those without,
deﬁne ω
j
n,−i as the vector of choices of agents within group j other than that of
i,a n dωl
n,i as the vector of choices of all agents in group l 6= j. Durlauf (2004)
identiﬁes four basic inﬂuences on agent behavior. This project modiﬁes them
to incorporate multiple groups and adds a ﬁfth.
1. X
j
i is a vector of deterministic (to the modeler) individual-speciﬁcc h a r -
acteristics associated with individual i in group j.
2. ε
j
i is a vector of random individual-speciﬁc characteristics associated
with individual i in group j.








is the subjective beliefs individual i possesses about behav-









is the subjective beliefs individual i possesses about
behaviors of agents in group l, described as a probability measure over those
behaviors.
Again following the literature (Manski 1993), this project will refer to Yj as















as a “between-group endogenous” eﬀect.
This paper also assumes that beliefs are rational, leading to a simple modi-













































We can then make the standard assumption that individual choices follow:
ω
j

























A relevant extension concerns the standard statement of mean group behavior:
¯ ω−i =( I − 1)
−1 X
k6=i ωk. Without modiﬁcation, and in the context of multiple















that is, the prototypical model of a single group necessarily assumes that there is
no feedback between groups. This paper will specify more generally the vector:
¯ ω
j






















To ﬁx ideas, note that self-selection into groups is ignored.
4 The Econometric Model
Moving to a discussion of econometrics, the expanded linear-in-means model
is speciﬁed here. The extension to the classic linear model is the addition of
between-group eﬀects. As discussed above, agents have rational beliefs about the
actions of individuals in their group and in others. They also have knowledge of
the characteristics of all individuals, groups and neighborhoods. Explicitly, the
extensions are two. One, agents care about the diﬀerence in contextual eﬀects
between their own group and others, and two, they care about the diﬀerence in
9average action between their own group and others. Note that this does not
allow for individuals to have distinct reactions to diﬀerent out-groups, and is
made to simplify calculations below.
Note that for the model to be identiﬁable, there must be suﬃcient variation
in group-level variables across neighborhoods: that is, girls in each school cannot
behave identically in response to observed information.
4.1 Two Groups
Consider ﬁrst the case of two groups: 1,2.I nm o d e lf o r m ,t h i si se x p r e s s e da s
the pair of equations:
ω1
i = k1 + c1X1
i + d1Q1 + g1Z1,k + α1m1 + ε1
i (2)
ω2
i = k2 + c2X2




i = k1 + c1X1
i + d1Q1 +( g1 + α1)m1 + g1m2 + ε1
i (20)
ω2
i = k2 + c2X2
i + d2Q2 +( g2 + α2)m2 + g2m1 + ε2
i
where kj,c j,d j,g j, and αj,j =1 ,2 are coeﬃcients, X
j
i is an r-length vector of
individual characteristics, Qj is an s length vector of distinct contextual eﬀect
deviations: Qj =( Yj − Ek6=j∈JYk),Y j speciﬁes a group j contextual eﬀect,
mj = Eiω
j
i,a n dZj,k = Eiω
j
i − Ei,kωk
i ,∀k 6= j ∈ J is a scalar measuring
between-group endogenous eﬀects. It should further be noted that to ensure
that the models in 2 are valid regression models, the assumption is made that













i ,Q j,Z j,k,m j
i
,j=1 ,2.
Assuming agents in each group observe rational expectations, and assuming
that gj + αj 6=1 ,j=1 ,2, and writing Xj = E
£
X1




k1 + c1X1 + d1Q1 − g1m2
1 − (g1 + α1)
(3)
m2 =
k2 + c2X2 + d2Q2 − g2m1
1 − (g2 + α2)
10Expanding produces:
m1 =
k1 + c1X1 + d1 (Y1 − Y2) − g1m2
1 − (g1 + α1)
m2 =
k2 + c2X2 + d2 (Y2 − Y1) − g2m1
1 − (g2 + α2)
substituting back into (3):
ω1
i = k1 + c1X1
i + d1 (Y1 − Y2) − g1m2 +
+(α1 + g1)
k1 + c1X1 + d1 (Y1 − Y2) − g1m2




i = k2 + c2X2
i + d2 (Y2 − Y1) − g2m1 +
+(α2 + g2)
k2 + c2X2 + d2 (Y2 − Y1) − g2m1
1 − (g2 + α2)
+ ε2
i












































1 − (g1 + α1)
+ c1X1
i +
(α1 + g1)c1 + d1












1 − (g2 + α2)
+ c2X2
i +
(α2 + g2)c2 + d2









The econometric issue at this point is whether there are suﬃciently many
linearly independent coeﬃcients in (40) to identify the structural parameters in
11(2). We can see that the pair of equations (40) produces r +2 s +1for each
of the two equations. The model (2) has 1+r +( s +1 )structural parameters
for each of the two equations. It is straightforward to see that in the absence
of hairline collinearity between the regressors in (40), the model is identiﬁed if
s ≥ 2.
4.2 Reduction to Manski’s Classic Linear-in-Means Model
Notice that the key to resolution of the identiﬁcation problem in this context
is the addition of the between-groups eﬀect. Without this eﬀect, equation (2)
reduces to
ω1
i = k1 + c1X1
i + d1Y1 + α1m1 + ε1
i
and the problem is the same as in Manski (1993). Apply rational expectations
and then abbreviate equation (4) as follows: consider only group 1 and remove
between group eﬀects (g1 =0 ,Y 2 =0 ) . This reveals the well known equation














As is well known, identiﬁc a t i o nf a i l si nt h i sc a s e .
4.3 N Groups
Similar to the two-group case above, one can see the general multi-group case
here. In model form, this is expressed as the system of equations for a collection
of J = N groups:
ω1
i = k1 + c1X1
i + d1Q1 + g1Z1,k + α1m1 + ε1
i (6)
ω2
i = k2 + c2X2





i = kN + cNXN




i = k1 + c1X1
i + d1Q1 +( g1 + α1)m1
n + g1A1,k + ε1
i
ω2
i = k2 + c2X2
i + d2Q2 +( g2 + α2)m2





i = kN + cNXN
i + dNQN +( gN + αN)mN
n + gNAN,k + εN
i
where kj,c j,d j,g j, and αj,∀j ∈ J are coeﬃcients, X
j
i is an r-length vector of
individual characteristics, Qj
n is an s(J − 1) length vector of distinct contextual
eﬀect deviations: Qj =( Yj − Ek6=j∈JYk),Y j speciﬁes a s(J − 1) length contex-
tual eﬀect for group j, mj = Eiω
j
i, Zj,k = Eiω
j
i − Eiωk
i ,∀k 6= j ∈ J is a J − 1
length vector of between-group endogenous eﬀects, and A1,k ≡
X
j∈J mj.O n e













i ,Q j,Z j,k,m j
i
,j=1 ,2,...N,we complete the
model speciﬁcation.
Assuming all agents observe rational expectations, allowing the standard
regression assumptions of conditional mean-zero, and assuming that (1 − J)gj+
αj 6=1 ,∀j we have:
m1 =
k1 + c1X1 + d1Q1 − g1A1,k
1 − ((J − 1)g1 + α1)
m2 =
k2 + c2X2 + d2Q2 − g2A2,k
1 − ((J − 1)g2 + α2)
...
mN =
kN + cNXN + dNQN − gNAN,k
1 − ((J − 1)gN + αN)
this can also be written as:
m1 =
k1 + c1X1 + d1Q1 − g1
X
l6=1 ml
1 − ((J − 1)g1 + α1)
m2 =
k2 + c2X2 + d2Q2 − g2
X
l6=2 ml
1 − ((J − 1)g2 + α2)
...
mN =
kN + cNXN + dNQN − gN
X
l6=N ml
1 − ((J − 1)gN + αN)
13Expanding this:
m1 =










1 − ((J − 1)g1 + α1)
m2 =










1 − ((J − 1)g2 + α2)
...,
mN =










1 − ((J − 1)gN + αN)
substituting back into the above:
ω1












+(α1 +( J − 1)g1)


























+(α2 +( J − 1)g2)



























(αN +( J − 1)gN)










1 − ((J − 1)gN + αN)
14noting that Yj,m j and Xj, Yj are econometrically indistinguishable:
ω1












+(α1 +( J − 1)g1)


























+(α2 +( J − 1)g2)



























+(αN +( J − 1)gN)











1 − ((J − 1)gN + αN)
To simplify notation, grouping terms and deﬁning the superparameters β,δ,γ,
βj =
kj
1 − ((J − 1)gj + αj)
δj =
(αj +( J − 1)gj)cj + dj
1 − ((J − 1)gj + αj)
γj =
(αj +( J − 1)gj)dj





w ec a nt h e nw r i t e :
ω1
i = β1 + c1X1
i + δ1Y1 + γ1
X
l6=1 Yl + ε1
i (7)
ω2
i = β2 + c2X2
i + δ2Y2 + γ2
X




i = βN + cNXN
i + δNYN + γN
X
l6=N Yl + εN
i
The econometric issue at this point is whether there are suﬃciently many lin-
early independent coeﬃcients in (7) to identify the structural parameters in
(6).




∂Yk 6=0 ,∀j 6= k ∈ J, The linear-in-means model with between-group eﬀects
(6)can be identiﬁed if s ≥ N.
15Proof. The proof is immediate from equations (6)and (7). Note that equa-
tion (7) has r + Ns +1coeﬃcients in each of the N equations - leading to
N (r + Ns+1 )independent coeﬃcients. The model (6) has N [r +( s +1 )( N − 1)]
structural parameters to identify. It is clear then that
N (r + Ns+1 )≥ N [r +( s +1 )( N − 1)]
iﬀ s ≥ N.
The immediate question is whether the assumption that agents care about
diﬀerences between own contextual eﬀects and out-group ones is appropriate.
Two justiﬁcations are in order. First, concern for out-group behavior naturally
extends to both contextual and endogenous eﬀects — if present at all. Second,
we can see that this is a generalization of the linear-in-means model for ﬁnite
numbers of out-groups. As the number of groups increases (J →∞ ),i ti sc l e a r
that the expectation term becomes a constant in the regression and the identiﬁ-
cation problem arises again. In fact, the result is analytically indistinguishable
from the classic linear-in-means model.
Corollary 2 As J →∞ ,i d e n t i ﬁcation fails and the model reduces to the linear-
in-means model and cannot be fully identiﬁed.
Proof. Assume J is large, and note that in this case, the average out-group
eﬀects are constant across groups. That is, for all groups j,
X
l6=j
Y = ˆ Y .T h u s
(7) can be expressed as:
ω1
i = β1 + c1X1
i + δ1Y1 + γ1ˆ Y + ε1
i (8)
ω2
i = β2 + c2X2




i = βN + cNXN
i + δNYN + γN ˆ Y + εN
i
Then, the ˆ Y term becomes part of the constant in the regression and this system
only has N (r + s +1 )coeﬃcients - short of the N [r +( s +1 )( N − 1)] needed
for identiﬁcation.
165 Reference Groups
Hand-in-hand with the extension of the linear-in-means model is the ex-
panded diﬃculty of parsing reference groups out from a population. The meth-
ods for identifying an individuals group have varied widely from geographical
to sociological methods. A simple, but not completely satisfying approach is to
use census-tract level geographics as the basis for neighborhood identiﬁcation.
Studies using this measure of neighborhoods include Corcoran, et al. (1992),
Datcher (1982), Plotnick and Hoﬀman (1999). Turley (2003) used a census-tract
residence measure in combination with other indicators. Census based grouping
has clear problems, principally that it is doubtful that individuals consider all
those that live in the census geographic construct to be their reference group.
A resolution for this has been to use individuals’ self-declared reference
groups. Some data collection exercises have called on youth to identify their
best friends. Then groups of self-reported best friends can be used to test the-
oretical models. Though certainly more plausible than a geographic basis, this
method calls into question whether the scope of suggested inﬂuence is suﬃ-
ciently broad. For example, once the existence of social forces is acknowledged,
a teenager’s school performance is surely aﬀected by more than a small set of
self-reported friends.
Other authors use social measures of distance to indicate groups. Signiﬁ-
cantly, Conley & Topa (2002) used four measures including travel time, spa-
tial distance, occupational distance, and ethnicity distance. The particularly
promising component of this research vis-à-vis the project here is that it incor-
porates a metric of diﬀerence. The limiting feature of this model is the need to
specify the distance metric.
Identiﬁcation of multiple reference groups or neighborhoods adds new com-
plexities. Among these are the need for collection of data regarding individuals’
diﬀerent types of acquaintances, “enemies”, etc. It is not completely clear how
to extract information from individuals about their levels and degrees of friend-
ship (and/or envy, hate, etc.) that may delineate the groups that aﬀect them.
17In addition, the assumptions necessary for use of geographic data alone become
even less plausible in the multiple groups case. For example, even if one were
to accept that one’s own census tract is the appropriate neighborhood for mea-
surement, assuming that all other tracts have a measurable impact is a further
stretch.
Perhaps most realistic is the use of ethnicity or age-cohort data as a measure.
Each of are discrete, and readily accessible measures of reference — discreteness
being essential to ensure that cross-group interactions can diﬀer. In the Conley
& Topa model distance is a one-dimensional concept — thus one cannot seek to be
like one out-group and diﬀerent than another one (i.e. Hispanic youth cannot
seek to mimic some aspects of African American culture and reject similarly
deﬁned parts of “White” American culture).
6 Complementarity and Equilibrium
A key step in future research will be to investigate equilibria of these models.
In particular, the notions of existence of multiple equilibria critical to the so-
cial interactions ﬁeld have not been proven in the context of multiple reference
groups. Some of the points to note include:
Within-group complementarity and the absence of between-group eﬀects
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=0 ,∀i,j (Durlauf 2004). This eﬀectively states that holding the
actions of out-group members constant, an agent experiences a greater increase
in utility by following the behavior of others. Between-group complementarity
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This suggests that holding own-group actions constant, an agent prefers to act
like others than to act diﬀerently.
7 Bias in Single-Group Models
Note that neither within or between-group interactions require positive inter-
actions. In fact, the study of between-group interactions is partially motivated
by the appearance of negative reactions to out-group behavior. The interesting
question here motivated by the inclusion of between-group eﬀects is whether
the study of a single neighborhood results in biased or attenuated conclusions.
If between-group complementarity is high, a study of within-group eﬀects can
result in spurious conclusions about the appearance of neighborhood eﬀects. To
s e et h i s ,c o n s i d e rt h ee t h n i cc o n ﬂict case again. Imagine that a Hutu is more
likely to commit an act of violence due to Tutsi violence than due to violent
behavior by Hutus; that is, the between-group eﬀect is larger. In this case, the
coeﬃcient on the between group eﬀect will be large, but if not included, the
resulting within-group coeﬃcient will be too large. This can lead to spurious
conclusions about the role of within-group eﬀects.
We can conclude that an investigation into endogenous neighborhood social
interactions which considers only within-group eﬀects leads to biased results if
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This set of complementarity conditions diﬀers from the last section. In the
prior section (9)and (10) are equivalent to the cross-partials of V () with respect
to ω
j
i and either ˆ ω
j
−i or ˆ ω
−j
i . These here, (11) and (12), instead compares the
cross-partials of V () with respect to ˆ ω
j
−i and ˆ ω
−j
i .
Further work is necessary to parse out the importance of the various com-
plementarity results here. The key implications here are twofold. First, the
apparent need for a measure of between-group complementarity to generate
multiple equilibria. Second, it is possible that suﬃciently large between-group
complementarity could swamp the within-group eﬀect, thus generating multiple
equilibria even in the absence of within-group interactions.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that a between-group generalized linear-in-means model
solves the reﬂection problem while maintaining a simple-to-estimate and in-
terpret linear form. However, it provides no insight into perhaps the greatest
outstanding question in this literature: the foundations or sources of social in-
teractions
20In addition to the continued research into this source question, future possi-
bilities include investigation of the universality properties of social interactions.
It would be a further boon to the advocates of the presence of social interactions
eﬀects if a multiple groups model veriﬁed prior work.
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